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Abstract. The economic crisis that began in 2008 raised the problem of bringing into 
discussion some very important economic issues, including financial instability, which is 
perhaps the most serious and important one. Thus, given that economic policies seek not 
only to solve and to present alternatives, but also to be a part of a broader vision that 
includes longer temporal considerations, the financial instability approach also involves 
ideological reviews, policy reviews and so on. Thus, the central idea of this paper is that 
there is liberalization versus regulation dilemma, especially in the banking sector. The 
paper aims to analyze the effects of the benefits and costs of both options on financial 
stability, taking into account the link between the financial economy and the real 
economy. The paper also offers some solutions and future prospects. 
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1. Financial liberalization and instability 
Financial liberalization aims to eliminate inefficiencies through: 1) the banking 
activities liberalization, by eliminating the interest rate threshold and ceiling on 
bank deposits and loans, removing the interest contingents, removing the prefe-
rential interest rates, reducing the obligatory reserve requirements; 2) relaxation of 
restrictions on non-banking financial intermediation activities, in order to increase 
competition; 3) the creation of new markets; 4) the progressive privatization of the 
state banks and using a policy that favours foreign bank penetration. 
There are several liberalisation proxies that have been used in the economic 
literature. But there are two main problems regarding them: a) their behaviour 
indicates that liberalisation reversed significantly; b) these are endogenous 
measures of liberalisation, which are affected by factors other than liberalisation. 
Some of the liberalization proxies are: the ratio of stock of personal sector 
consumer credit to gross domestic product; interest differential between deposit 
and borrowing rates; loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios and mortgage equity 
withdrawal (Corugedo and Price, 2002) 
 
2. Financial liberalization, instability and banking regulations 
Financial liberalization influence the banking stability and therefore the financial 
stability through several channels of transmission. 
First, interest rate deregulation is correlated with an increase in the level of 
interest rates. But due to maturity mismatch, which is linked to the maturity 
transformation of banking 
intermediaries, the performance of banking intermediaries may decrease when 
deregulation increases the cost of banking resources, while interest rates on assets 
do not react very rapidly due to their longer term. 
Second, financial liberalization involves the opening of the financial system. 
Financial liberalization may lead to the creation of regional financial centres. For 
the banking sectors, the opening of the financial system offers the possibility of 
raising funds in foreign stock markets; this is the currency mismatch situation, 
where the granted credits are secured with short term currency commitments; in 
the case of capital outflows, this is a weakening factor. These imbalances might 
explain some of the previous banking crises.  Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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Third, the bank loans deregulation increases the number of granted commercial 
bank loans to the private sector. There are two indicators that illustrate the credit 
availability easing. 
The first indicator is the comparison of real domestic credit growth rates in the 
private sector and gross domestic product, which emphasize that the countries 
where the credit increases faster than gross domestic product on long-run are 
followed by a monetary crisis. 
The second indicator is the evolution of the ratio of domestic credit to gross 
domestic product, which evaluates the lending boom. Every lending boom was 
prior the financial liberalization. The expansion of domestic credit is correlated 
with monetary crises, implying a higher risk of swings in investors’ confidence. 
The lending boom involves a growth in credit risk beard by commercial banks, 
which increases the probability of banking balance sheets erosion. 
The lending boom implies an “over borrowing syndrome” (the transition’s result 
from a repressed economy to a liberalized economy). This syndrome raises 
questions regarding the solidity and efficiency of the banking system. So, the 
government’s guarantee on banking deposits has a counter-productive effect on 
financial stability; thus, “institutional failures” are a part of the mechanism of 
moral hazard. 
The expansion of liberalization is affecting the real sector through two main 
channels: 1) easy monetary policy, which stimulates activity through an increase 
in permanent income; 2) access to credit allows firms to exploit technologies, 
leading to productivity gains (which has a direct effect on real activity). 
Regarding the role of institutional factors in the banking crisis (which may lead to 
financial instability episodes), it can be noticed that: i) the deposit insurance 
increases the probability of a banking crisis (moral hazard is higher than the 
stabilizing effect of insurance); ii) the weakness of the legal system is an 
important factor in banking crises; iii) contractual arrangements of the creditors’ 
rights over borrowers have a less significant impact.  
The institutional logic rests on three pillars: 1) the first-best situation (prudent 
financial supervision is completely efficient); 2) the second-best situation (the 
necessity to supervise the composition of expansion in banking lending and its 
aggregate level, in order to monitory the inadequacies from the supervisory 
system; it is a question of a policy of negative directed credit programs that aims 
to ensure and maintain financial stability); 3) the third-best situation (the measures Cristian Ionescu 
	
148 
are followed by controls that aim to restrict the entry of capital, in the case of a 
moral hazard problem in the financial system). 
There are five requirements in order to achieve a successful liberalization: (i) 
adequate supervision and prudential regulation for commercial banks; (ii) a 
reasonable degree of price stability; (iii) budgetary discipline, which limits the 
negative effects of inflation tax; (iv) commercial bank behaviour aimed at 
maximizing profits; (v) a fiscal system, which is neutral in regards to 
intermediation activity (Allegret and Dulbecco, 2003). 
The emerging economies have weaker regulation systems than the developed 
countries. So, they are very vulnerable to shocks after a financial opening, which 
requires the public intervention in the financial sector. Therefore, the increase of 
banking crises in the emerging markets may be a result of excessive financial 
liberalization, followed by an inadequate institutional infrastructure. 
 
 3. Financial instability and financial liberalization 
Regarding the financial liberalization’ effects on the macroeconomic stability, for 
the economies with an intermediate level of financial development, the full 
financial liberalization, by opening the domestic markets to foreign capital flows, 
is destabilizing, leading to periods of growth and capital inflows which are 
followed by collapse and capital run. But foreign direct investment does not have 
destabilizing effects, because foreign direct investors use their own credit. The 
economies at intermediate stages of financial development must analyze the 
manner they will choose to liberalize the capital account. One viable approach is 
to allow foreign direct investment and to impose initial restrictions regarding the 
portfolio investment. 
Higher investment generate higher output and higher profits, which improve 
creditworthiness and increase borrowing which also leads to higher investment. 
So, the capital inflows finance the boom, which increases the demand for country-
specific factors and the price relative to the output good. This increase of the input 
prices reduces the profits, the creditworthiness, the borrowing, the investment and 
the aggregate output. After the investment fall, all these processes are reversed 
and they create the conditions for another boom. This endogenous instability is 
causing shocks that have persistent effects. 
At very high levels of financial development, investment do not face cash flows 
constrains; thus, cash flows shocks are quite irrelevant. At very low levels of 
financial development, firms have to manage borrow constraints, being unable to Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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response to cash-flow shocks. Thus, the disappearance of shocks will not cause 
any significant turmoil. But the intermediate levels of financial development 
involve cash flow shocks that lead to significant effects, which may represent 
sources of instability. 
Therefore, opening an economy to foreign capital may be destabilizing: the 
response of an economy that has a closed capital market, in the case of a cash 
flow shock, will be limited depending on the available capital to entrepreneurs. 
Additional funding sources in the case of an open economy will increase the 
response to a shock or to a high probability / dimension of volatility. 
 
4. Liberalizing foreign lending 
It is considered an economy that has low domestic savings; first, the economy is 
not open to foreign borrowing and lending. At each date, the current wealth of 
domestic lenders     is important (domestic investment being constrained by 
domestic savings         ). If it is supposed that the initial levels of 
entrepreneurs’ wealth and the initial levels of domestic lenders’ wealth (  ,   ) 
are very small, so initially     0 , domestic entrepreneurs are unable to drain the 
supply of country-specific inputs. At date 0, domestic savings (       ) are 
smaller than the investment capacity ( 1       
 , where   (  0    is the credit 
multiplier, reflecting the level of a domestic economy’ financial development. 
When   0 , the credit market collapse and the investors can use only their own 
credit. When μ       , opening an economy to foreign lending has no relevant 
significance, due to the fact that the investment capacity of the domestic 
entrepreneurs is unable to absorb the domestic savings, so there is no need for 
borrowing. When   1 , there is an excessive investment capacity (as long as 
    0, where     is the price of the country specific factor). Therefore, the 
domestic interest rate   , in a closed economy, is influenced by      and     
 , 
where   is the period and     is the maximum quantity of available lending to 
entrepreneurs; thus, entrepreneurs makes no distinction between borrowing and 
lending (    1   ⁄ ). If     0  and   
        
 , then: 
    
     1       
1
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where 1    is the fixed percentage of the agents’ savings in the aggregate 
wealth;    is the consumed percentage;    is the exogenous income in terms of 
output, 
 
  is the productivity proxy. 
There are many conditions under which     0  and     1   ⁄  for any  , where the 
wealth of the entrepreneurs will increase as the rate  1        ⁄  decreases, due to 
the fact that it is constrained by the reduced level of domestic savings; also, 
    
     
   will intersect the 45 degree line at the point where     0 , meaning 
that there are no persistent fluctuations. 
In the case of a fully opened economy to foreign borrowing and lending, the 
interest rate will be established at the international level  . This might stabilize a 
closed economy, that otherwise would temporarily fluctuate in order to react to 
the interest rate movements. But the opening of a closed economy to foreign 
lending also involves net capital inflows, so the investors acquire the excess of 
funds demand from the international capital markets. The rise in borrowing 
increases the bid price of the country-specific factor, which leads to permanent 
fluctuations of  ,    and aggregate output. 
Figure 1 illustrates the liberalization case. The wealth schedule increases after the 
liberalization.    is the stable steady-state level of wealth of the borrowers before 
the opening of the economy to foreign borrowing and lending. After the 
liberalization,       is increasing progressively as capital inflows induce the 
investors’ increase of borrowing, investments and profits. During the first two 
periods of liberalization, the demand for the country-specific factor is low so that 
  0 . In period 3 (  
 )   starts to increase, but there is still economic growth. In 
period 4 (   
 ) the price effect of the liberalization will strongly reduce the 
investors’ net worth, leading to a recession. Aggregate lending drops, capital 
flows run out the country and the real exchange depreciates (  is significantly 
reducing). But the gain in competitiveness may rebuild the firms’ net worth, so 
growth can eventually continue.  
But the illustration from the figure 1 is available only for intermediate levels of 
financial development. If    is large enough, there is no volatility in the open 
economy (as presented by the third segment of the curve that intersects the 45 
degree line). When   0 , financial opening will not support investment and there 
will be no capital inflow, so there is no upward pressure regaring the price of the Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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country-specific input. Therefore, a country that wishes to increase  , will have to 
develop the domestic financial sector before fully opening to foreign lending. 
 
Figure 1. Liberalizing foreign lending 
 
4.1. Foreign direct investment 
While a full liberalization may have destabilizing effects, in the case of 
intermediate levels of financial development, the economies will not face 
volatility only due to the opening to foreign direct investment. Foreign direct 
investment is different from other financial flows: these are part of the equity of 
the firms, and investors have full information regarding the situation of the firms.  
If the domestic cash flows are small, so that domestic investment are unable to 
fully absorb the supply of country-specific factors, foreign direct investors are 
stimulated to enter the economy in order to take advantage from the low price of 
the country-specific factors. This will increase and even fluctuate as a result of 
foreign direct investment. The price fluctuations will affect the distribution of 
profits between domestic and foreign investors, but they will not affect the 
aggregate output. The aggregate output will be stabilized at the level of the supply 
of factor resources  , where there is a probability that the economy will be 
destabilized in the situation of a fully opening to foreign portfolio investment. 
If the closed economy opens only to foreign direct investment, and if    is large 
enough, and firms can borrow the desired amount from the domestic market, the Cristian Ionescu 
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foreign direct investment will flow into the economy as long as the investment’s 
rate of return is higher than    . So, if   is the net inflow of direct investment, 
the equilibrium condition of free-entry is as following: 
  0         ,  
where                       ⁄   is the net rate of return on foreign direct 
investment and      is the domestic interest rate. If domestic savings are smaller 
than the domestic entrepreneurs’ investment capacity (           ), then: 
      1   ⁄ . But when domestic savings are exceeding the domestic entrepreneurs’ 
investment capacity, then:         , where   is the return of an alternative and 
inefficient technology. In the case of a closed economy, lenders will invest in this 
technology. Even in the case where foreign direct investment leads to a increase in 
price, it does not generate a price and/or output volatility. 
If the economy is opened to foreign borrowing and lending at rate   (only  to 
foreign portfolio flows), it becomes volatile (Figure 4). But the opening to foreign 
direct investment will stabilize the price of the country-specific factor to  ∗. 
Therefore: 
                             
The resulting effects will be the elimination of investment and output volatility. If 
the foreign direct investment inflows and outflows are not limited, the price of the 
country-specific factor and the aggregate domestic gross domestic product will be 
constant at equilibrium. 
Foreign direct investment act as a stabilizing force because unlike foreign lending 
it is  not depending on the creditworthiness of the domestic firms, and because 
during recessions or unfavourable economic periods foreign direct investors will 
enter the economy in order to take advantage from the low price of the country-
specific factor. 
When foreign direct investment and domestic direct investment are 
complementary, there are several possible situations: a) there may exist legal 
restrictions, so the total amount of foreign direct investment cannot be higher than 
a fixed percentage   of domestic investors’ wealth   ; b) there may be a need for 
local investors to impose dividend payments or to exert control. Therefore, 
complementary foreign direct investments (         ) may de-stabilize an 
emerging market economy. But different from the situation of unrestricted foreign 
direct investment, such direct investments will finally decrease during periods of 
economic and financial difficulties, when investors’ wealth     
   is  facing 
problems. Recessions will be deeper than the recessions where foreign direct Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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investment is absent, due to the fact that the increase in    during the boom period 
increases the production costs and accentuates the firms’ credit-crunch. Therefore, 
while the unrestricted foreign direct investment has stabilizing effects on an open 
emerging market economy, opening the economy to restricted foreign direct 
investment will have de-stabilizing effects. 
 
4.2. Effect of shocks 
Although the permanent volatility and permanent cycles are important, it is also 
essential to analyze the effects of shocks on a fully opened to foreign borrowing 
and lending economy where firms faces credit constrains.  
Figure 2 illustrates the wealth schedule shift after a downward productivity shock. 
It is taken under consideration the case where the wealth schedule intersects the 
45 degrees line on the downward sloping part (which corresponds to intermediate 
values of  ), with a slope smaller than one, so that the steady-state equilibrium   
is an attractor in the absence of a shock on  . The steady-state equilibrium  ′ a 
permanent shock  →	  ′   is still an attractor; finally, the economy will be 
stabilizing in the long-run. But starting from the steady-state point  , the initial 
effect of a negative shock on   will determine a severe fall in wealth   
  below 
the new steady-state level  ′. Recovery will occur and the economy will converge 
to the new steady-state	 ′. Therefore, the shock  →	  ′ is initially amplified by 
an economy with an intermediate level of financial development and which has 
been fully open to foreign borrowing and lending (Aghion et.al., 1999). 
 
Figure 2. Permanent productivity shock  Cristian Ionescu 
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A  temporary productivity shock  →	  ′   (one downward shift in the wealth 
schedule), will induce a severe fall in output than is warranted by the shock itself 
(an amplified effect), due to the fact that immediately after the shock the price of 
the non-traded good is too high relative to the price on the steady-state level. 
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamic response of output. 
 
Figure 3. Temporary productivity shock 
 
There are two aspects that must be underlined. First, one situation was the one 
where the steady-state is an attractor. A similar, but more complicated analysis, 
could be undertaken for the case where the economy converges to a cycle; 
therefore, a negative shock on   creates an initially lower level of output than the 
level on steady-state. Second, the amplified and non-monotonic response pattern 
is contrasting with the slow (and monotonic) response of wealth and output to a 
negative productivity shock in an economy that has a very low / very high degree 
of financial development. 
Volatility in emergent open economies is reflected in capital flows volatility and 
current account volatility. Therefore, financial instability is affecting the real 
economy, as well as it is affecting the financial economy. 
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5. Financial development and instability: the role of the labour share 
Labour share has an important role in creating instability in emergent open 
economies. 
Financial markets are imperfect, entrepreneurs are credit constrained, the credit 
constraints are tighter for low levels of financial development. Once the degree of 
financial development starts to increase, output also increases, but instability 
appears for intermediate levels of financial development. Changes in the labour 
share play an important role in eroding profitability. So, financial crises are 
associated with critical movements in the sharing of value added between capital 
and labour. 
 
5.1. Dynamic behaviour 
There are two main possible regimes: a constrained and an unconstrained regime.  
5.1.1. Constrained regime: 
If      , then    ∗      . Therefore, dynamics of the capital stock are as 
following:  
       
     	   ă	       
  	   ă	       
 
If the economy has an entrepreneurial wealth above   , then the entrepreneurs are 
able to finance the optimal stock   , and the economy will always stay at   . In 
this case, there are multiple possible dynamics paths: a) if  ^    ∗, the capital 
stock converges monotonically to the steady state; b) if  ^    ∗, then various 
scenarios are possible : monotonic convergence, cyclical convergence, permanent 
cycles or divergence (Orgiazzi, 2007). 
Three of these possible cases are illustrated in figures 4, 5 and 6. Figure 4 
illustrates the case where the steady state capital stock is situated to the left of the 
maximum of the       schedule ( ^    ∗); therefore, the capital stock increases 
until it reaches the steady state  ^. Figure 5 illustrates the case of an economy that 
converges cyclically. Figure 6 illustrates the case of an economy of a two-period 
cycle. But it is impossible to obtain analytical conditions that indicate the 
situations where each of these scenarios would prevail.  
5.1.2. Unconstrained regime 
When the level of financial liberalization greater than    ,    ∗       leads us to 
a point where entrepreneurs are not constrained; therefore, they invest as much as Cristian Ionescu 
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they want. In this case,    is the maximum quantity that entrepreneurs want to 
invest in their own technology. At   , the economy remains at this level; the 
dynamics of capital stock are: 
       
     	   ă	          	ş 	       
  	         
 
       
Figure 4. Monotonic convergence                                Figure 5. Cyclical convergence  
to the stable steady state                                                to the stable steady state 
 
 
     
Figure 6. A stable period-2 cycle                                  Figure 7. Unconstrained regime 
 
There can be considered  the following variables:   
~ and   
~, so that	    
~   
    
~       (  
~     
~). Due to the fact that       is concave and 
      
    0 , for 
any        , then   
~ decreases with  , while   
~ increases. A higher   means a 
greater range of   values that implies that entrepreneurs are not constrained Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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(Figure 7). The economy will converge to   , cyclically or monotonically, depen-
ding on the value of        and depending on the initial level of capital. 
Notations are as follows:    is the capital stock;    is the desired capital stock, 
     	 is the equation of capital stock per worker;  ^ is the steady state capital;  ∗ 
is the stock of capital at which function       reaches its peak;    is the lowest 
level of financial development in order to ensure that at some point entrepreneurs 
will no longer be constrained. 
 
6. The government, elections, exchange crisis, banking crises and banking reforms 
In an emerging market economy that has achieved a positive steady state 
economic growth rate   , financial intermediation takes place through a large 
banking sector. But banking supervision is still developing bad loans (  ), which 
increase over time at a rate  : 
            1     	  	      ,       0 	     	       
The accumulation of bad loans is not observed by market participants, but may be 
observed by the government, which has the responsibility for banking supervision 
(through the central bank).   follows the function   0  until   , when it jumps to 
  . Market participants know this function and the probability     that   may 
jump in each period of a given length,  but do not observe   , the moment when 
the bad loan problem emerges. 
The government is not a benevolent optimizer, but will implement  the reform of 
the banking sector if it serves its political purposes (the re-election at the election 
date      ). The electorate is concerned only about economic growth, and will re-
elect the government if growth is higher than   . 
The government knows that cleaning up the banking system will reduce growth 
by reducing available credit. If it is considered that growth is reduced by the 
amount of bad loans at the moment of clean up (        ), it will gradually 
return to normal, since the restructuring banks must reduce lending immediately 
and it takes time for the resources reallocation (figure 8): 
                     min               ,             	             
Therefore, the occurrence of the reform (            ) raise the gaps by 
          and recovers over time to steady state growth   . 
 Cristian Ionescu 
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Figure 8. Growth fluctuations after a banking sector revisal 
 
This leads to the first result of non transparency or indecision: if elections are 
relatively far away, the government will implement a banking sector reform after 
observing the banking sector problems. But a positive    implies that there is a 
specific period of time, before the elections (               ), after which the 
government will no longer implement any banking reform, in order not to revelate 
the problems induced by the severe reduction in economic growth, which would 
not recover in time for the elections. Therefore, the government stops reform 
when: 
                                 ⁄  
The length of the period in which the government undertakes easy banking 
supervision or is not revealing the problems is       ⁄ , and varies linearly with the 
size of the jump in bad loans,   , having an impact of the jump on growth,  , and 
an inversely impact with the speed at which growth returns to normal,  . 
There are specific conditions under which non-transparency may lead to an 
external crisis. 
It is assumed that the central bank has reserves in order to honor its commitments 
(related to the exchange rate and to the objective to maintain an adequate banking 
system). Therefore, the central bank requires a minimum level of reserves (equal 
to M1 and to the expected size of bad loans in order to avoid an attack on the 
currency or a run on the banks): 
              1         , 
where   is the exchange rate, and     are the foreign currency reserves. A severe 
fall of reserves below this minimum level will mean that the central bank is Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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unable to honor its commitments, so the confidence in a stable exchange rate is 
lost and the capital will fly over the country, leading to a devaluation of the 
currency to a new level: 
                1             ⁄  
If the credibility problems of the Central Bank are not taken into consideration, it 
may be assumed that the central bank prevents the capital flight by devaluing, in 
order to keep away a potential future greater devaluation. Moreover, it may be 
assumed that the exchange rate appreciates in order to accommodate a better than 
expected bad loan result and in order to reward investors for maintaining their 
currency holdings. 
There are three main aspects that must be underlined. The first aspect is related to 
the “warchest” result: if the country has ample reserves, it do not have to manage 
a severe speculative attack (neither in the elections period or after the elections 
period, when the bad loans are revealed). If the size of reserves is higher than the 
maximum size of bad loans, the central bank is prepared for the worst case 
scenario and will be able to honor its commitments: 
                     1        ,          1 
   
 
    
The “warchest” reserve level is quadratic in the jump in bad loans,   , since it 
affects both the length of period during which the bad loan problem is hidden and 
the rate at which the problem is accumulated. 
The second result is the post-election disappointment or revelation result. There 
may be a possibility for an exchange crisis occurrence (when the elections are 
over, the new government is settled, the real state of the economy is revealed, the 
situation of the bad loan problem is worse than expected). Therefore, the 
exchange rate may be devalued in order to restore the relation between the 
exchange rate and the level of reserves. For the case where              before 
the elections, the change in the exchange rate is: 
1 
 1        
 1           
 0 	       ă	                  
This means that the expected exchange rate change is zero, and that the exchange 
rate devalues upon a negative surprise. If reserves would allow to a preelection 
crisis not to occur, and if the size of bad loans is higher than the level that would 
have triggered a crisis before the election, a crisis will eventually take place. Cristian Ionescu 
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The third result is the election anticipation result: if reserves are small, a currency 
attack can’t be avoided in the elections period. Taking into consideration the   
non-transparency problem, market participants can compute the trajectory of the 
maximum size of bad loans, and they can form expectations regarindg the actual 
size of the bad loan problem. The size of the expected bad loans       depends 
on the probability distribution of  . 
In order to avoid a reserve run during the non-election times, the central bank 
needs to maintain a minimum amount of M1 in reserves. In order to avoid a 
reserves run during the elections, the central bank needs to have a “warchest”. The 
size of the additional reserves in order to avoid a pre-election crisis depends on 
the size of the jump in bad loans    and on the impact of bad loans on growth and 
the speed of adjustment. It is improbable that an independent central bank has 
insufficient reserves in order to cover the expected bad loan problem if it already 
covers Ml, unless it misreads the market’s expectations regarding the quality of 
the banking sector and if the problems are serious. In such situations, the 
exchange rate crises will occur after the election period. The misreading of market 
expectations may occur, especially when the problems are sizeable, and when the 
negative market perception of the bad loan problem manifests in a large scale by 
withdrawing the interbank credit lines and loans. 
 
7. Why banks are fragile, and need regulation 
During financial crises, banks suffers from runs or liquidity problems. The 
illustration of the bank balance sheets should be edifying in understanding the 
fragility of banks, and the need for regulation. Figure 9 illustrates the balance 
sheet of a “traditional” bank. “There are two types of assets (liquid assets and 
illiquid loans) and two types of liabilities (capital and retail deposits). The main 
characteristic of banks that leads to fragility is the mismatch in maturity between 
assets and liabilities. Customers usually require only withdrawal of funds on a 
random basis, so the bank may survive with low levels of liquid assets (cash and 
short term government bonds) and may invest other in higher yielding but illiquid 
long term loans, while providing “liquidity insurance” to deposit clients at all 
times" (Davis, 2010). 
If the depositors believe that the banks are unable to pay them back, the banks 
may face a deposit run, where all depositors require funds in the same time. This 
liquidity problem that rapidly finishes the liquid assets, determine the bank to be 
unable to sell its illiquid assets at full value (due to the asymmetric information Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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problem) and may become insolvent. A bank may also become insolvent because of 
the simple losses on assets in excess of capital. In the case where customers believe 
that there are more banks with similar balance sheet weaknesses and/or counterparty 
links to the failing bank, bank runs become contagious across the system.  
 
Assets  Liabilities
Liquid assets  Capital
Illiquid loans  Retail deposits
Figure 9. “Traditional” bank 
 
Bank regulation aims to reduce risks. Capital adequacy regulation makes sure that 
the level of capital is enough to cover expected losses during loan defaults in a 
downturn. Liquidity regulation aims to ensure sufficient liquidity that can be 
accessed, in order to cover peak demands for deposit withdrawals. When liquid 
assets are inadequate, the lender of last resort function of the Central Bank is 
providing liquidity to the banks. Deposit insurance aims to prevent runs by 
providing depositors a guarantee of the nominal value of the assets. 
But the changes and developments in recent years are different from this 
framework. First, deregulation removed the limits to competition between banks, 
and put a higher weight on the prudential regulations. Second, the growth of 
wholesale financial markets (short term borrowing from other banks; for example, 
corporate treasurers and money market funds) have offered an alternative to retail 
deposits for funding the needs of the banks. Third, there has been a great 
development of securitisation, so the banks needed no more to hold loans on 
balance sheet, providing incentives to package and sell them to other investors, 
taking advantage from the great front-end fees from loan origination. 
Securitisation and wholesale markets have been a result of the development of 
globalisation of financial markets and information technology. 
 
“On balance sheet” 
Assets Liabilities
Liquid assets  Capital
Illiquid loans  Retail deposits
Illiquid securities  Wholesale deposits
 
“Off balance sheet” 
Loans being securitised Illiquid securities
Illiquid securities in SIV/conduit  Asset backed commercial paper with 
bank back up line of credit 
Figure 10. “Modern” bank Cristian Ionescu 
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Figure 10 illustrates the balance sheet of a “modern” bank, which is a response to 
the developments that seeks to maximise profitability. Therefore, the liquid assets 
are reduced to the lowest possible level, due to their low return, in comparison 
with other assets. Capital is maintained at the required level. In order to grow the 
balance sheet quicker than the situation with rigid retail deposits, the bank   
has a great volume of wholesale funding (“liability management”); this type of 
funding, although it is not typically covered by deposit insurance and held by 
well-informed investors, is much more subject to runs than retail deposits   
(Davis, 2010). Loan growth can exceed the given capital and deposits by 
securitisation of loans. 
Regulation of the modern bank is more complex. One key issue is the liquidity 
regulation, which should take into consideration both the risks of wholesale 
funding and low liquid asset holdings. Capital adequacy also needs to take 
account of  more complex risks involved by this new structure.  
 
8. Regulations on consolidated supervision  
The regulations also involve amendments that affect regulations regarding the 
consolidated supervision of financial groups. Some of these amendments give the 
possibility that each financial group is supervised and assessed as a single unit. 
Therefore, the relationships’ network and the risk-taking behavior through the 
network are more transparent and easier to supervise (Kálmán and Hamecz, 
2003). Moreover, the elaboration of decree-level regulations will alow financial 
intermediaries to provide better information for supervisory authorities. 
The importance of group-level regulations is emphasized by both domestic and 
international busts, which provides signals that the assessment and inspection of a 
certain institution on its own is unadequate in order to assess the stability or 
evaluate the financial position of such institution if there have been cosy 
institutional or personal links between the institutions supervised and other 
institutions or even natural persons or if they had vested interests, since such links 
or interests led to dependence (Kálmán and Hamecz, 2003). The supervision of 
hierarchical groups requires a different supervisory approach than the supervision 
of individual institutions. Because of their size, this type of groups is the most 
important and is a dominant agent in the national and international markets, which 
underlines the importance of regulations.  Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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The risk of contagion in a single institutional framework leads to contagion 
between multiple and various financial markets (banks, insurance companies, 
investment services providers); the effective regulations and supervision are 
essential in maintaining financial stability. 
The aim of this regulations and supervision is to treat institutions dependent on 
each other (seen as one unit that tries to take advantages from risk taking, that 
tries to exploit the regulatory arbitrage or tries to avoid special restrictions). 
 
8.1. Regulations pertaining to groups including a controlling credit institution 
Provisions pertaining to financial groups that comprise a controlling credit 
institution and/or a financial holding company that owns the credit institution 
should be implemented to two circles of institutions. The supervisory authority 
should: a) keep a record of all institutions and individuals which or who may 
influence the operations of a credit institution; b) keep a record of all enterprises 
that may be linked to the business operations due to influences from credit 
institutions (the close link relationship). Therefore, a supervisory authority should 
only be entitled to record data and request information in order to proper 
supervise the credit institution (in Figure 11, the widest possible circle). 
The second circle includes: a) investment firms and credit institutions with 
identical prudential requirements; b) financial companies complementing or 
ancillary undertakings directly supporting banking operations (Kálmán and 
Hamecz, 2003). Credit institutions and financial holding companies (Figure 12) 
should improve these aspects in their balance sheets, in their profit and loss 
accounts and in their records of positions. Therefore, inter-linked transactions and 
external risk-taking as a whole are included in various accounts, reflecting risk-
taking as if they were one single institution.  
 
Figure 11. Record-keeping and provision of information Cristian Ionescu 
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8.2. Regulations pertaining to groups including a controlling  
  investment firm 
Credit institutions and investment firms are considered as mutual competitors in 
the investment services market; they have the same limits of risk-taking, assets 
assessment, capital requirements and rules of consolidation. 
The personnel hierarchy affected by consolidated supervision is similar to the one 
of credit institution groups (Figure 13). Record-keeping and data provision 
obligations pertain to entities having a close link relationship with investment 
firms and their respective parent and participating companies (Kálmán and 
Hamecz, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 12. Consolidated requirements 
 
8.3. New organizational obligations of controlling entities  
A credit institution or investment firm should be subject to consolidated 
supervision in the case of a parent company- subsidiary relationship or a 
participating company relationship (close link relationship) between a institution 
or firm and a regulated institution. The supervised investment firm or credit 
institution should inform the supervisory authority of these kind of relationships.  
Regarding the business operations of the group, the top management of the 
controlling entity has the responsibility to meet the consolidation requirements, Financial stability between liberalization and regulation 
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due to the fact that the legal regulations should assign responsibility of the 
supervision of the business operations of subsidiaries to a member of the board of 
directors. 
 
 
Figure 13. Consolidated requirements 
 
Amendments should not only require supervised companies to comply with the 
new requirements, but also to facilitate the implementation of the requirements. 
For example, a controlling entity should request its subsidiaries to meet the group-
level requirements, and that the persons that have a close link relationship with the 
controlling entity should provide to supervisory authorities the needed 
information regarding the investment firm, financial holding company, controlling 
credit institution. 
For an adequate provision of consolidated data, a controlling entity should have a 
comprehensive information network that covers the entire group, including an IT 
system that provides data and a system of internal supervision. 
 
9. Conclusions from a simple cost-benefit analysis of tighter regulation 
Changing capital and liquidity ratios leads to changes in probability of financial 
crises. Thus, it is possible to calculate the expected gross gain from increasing Cristian Ionescu 
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capital and liquidity, and to compare the gain to the gross costs in terms of output. 
If it is taken under consideration the net present value of the costs and benefits of 
a tighter regulation, it would be necessary to take account of the costs of the post 
crisis recession. This would involve an analysis of the effects of changes in capital 
and liquidity on bank costs and on the path of consumption and investment over 
the short-run. The short-run costs of a crisis may be very high, and may outweigh 
any other costs. 
The flow costs of a financial crisis can be computed as a difference between the 
output 
that would have been at time   (   )  in the case of no crisis and the output after 
the crisis (   ). If these costs are multiplied by the change in the probability of the 
crisis that would arise as result of a policy action (tightening capital adequacy) 
before the crisis, the gross benefit at time   from a tighter regulation of scale   
(   ) may be calculated as following:         
                                  
These probabilities are seen as high estimates of the probability of preventing the 
loss of expected output, even if they are adequate estimates of the probability that 
the improved policy would prevent crises.  
Lower value added in the financial services sector also contributes to lower levels 
of gross domestic product in the future. Capital gains are recorded as a source of 
income and they are seen as part of gross domestic product, but the losses are not 
included in income. It is possible that several opportunities for the financial 
services industry to transform some gains into recorded income, leading to a 
lower gross domestic product, due to a misclassification of income, and not due to 
a loss of output, and so not reflecting the lower welfare. These types of losses 
should not be included in the costs of the crisis. 
A complete cost benefit analysis must evaluate the costs of policy actions (   ). 
Therefore, the new targets for capital ratios and liquidity requirements should be 
immediately achieved, either by a rights issue or by an injection of capital by the 
government. 
The cost benefit calculations should take into consideration the net present 
discounted value of the difference between    and    using a real discount factor 
(  ) (Barrell et.al., 2009):  
                       1           ⁄
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But the tighter capital and liquidity requirements does not necesarly imply the 
reduction in the probability of a crisis; moreover, tighter regulatory requirements 
decrease the gain, although it always remains positive. 
There are many factors that affect the “optimal” increase in capital and liquidity. 
For example, policy changes could be less effective in calming the asset price 
bubbles and in reducing the probability of crisis, so the benefits would be lower 
(Barrell et.al., 2009), although the estimation of the scale of the reduction in 
benefits is difficult to compute. Taking into consideration that the benefits 
increase at a declining rate and that costs increase linearly, any reduction in 
benefits or costs may lead to different outcomes regarding the policy change that 
induces the highest expected net benefits.  
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